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INTRODUCTION
This is the third in a series of articles by researchers at RAND's
Institute for Civil Justice, the University of Virginia Law School, and
the Hudson Institute dealing with reform of auto insurance. We des-
ignate the two prior articles, Maryland One1 and Maryland Two.2 All
three articles concern allowing motorists to opt out of the status quo
by purchasing first-party auto insurance payable without reference to
* The Samuel H. McCoy II and Class of 1948 Professor of Law, University of Virginia;
B.A., Dartmouth College; J.D., Harvard University.
** Senior Economist, RAND; B.S., M.S., Illinois Institute of Technology; Ph.D., Johns
Hopkins University.
*** Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; B.A, City University of New York; J.D., Yale University.
**** Mathematician, RAND; B.S., Ph.D., University of Michigan.
***** BA, Yale University.
1. Jeffrey O'Connell et al., Consumer Choice in the Auto Insurance Market, 52 MD. L. Rv.
1016 (1993) [hereinafter Maryland One].
2. Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The Costs of Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance in States With-
out No-Fault Insurance, 54 MD. L. REv. 281 (1995) [hereinafter Maryland Two]. Additional
articles are a distinct possibility as further updated data become available. See, e.g., infra
note 61.
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fault for personal injury,3 coupled with abolition of claims for pain
and suffering both by and against them (except for drunken,
drugged, or intentional misconduct). The first two articles concerned
the effects of such laws allowing choice in states without no-fault laws,
including "add-on" laws.4 Throughout all three articles we adopt ter-
minology whereby under either a no-fault or add-on system, insurance
payable for economic loss without regard to fault is termed personal
injury protection (PIP).'
The purpose of this third Article is to include the actuarial results
of allowing motorists in states currently with a no-fault law to opt out
of claiming and being claimed against for pain and suffering even in
cases above the existing no-fault threshold.
Maryland One began by discussing an earlier RAND study indicat-
ing the following:
* [No-fault systems] either can produce substantial sav-
ings over the fault-based system or [they] can increase costs,
depending both on the plan's design and on differences
among states that affect auto insurance costs. For example,
the level of PIP benefits, the nature and size of barriers to
pursuit of tort claims for pain and suffering [i.e., thresholds],
and the litigious nature of a state's population will all factor
into the cost equation.
* [No-fault] plans reduce transaction costs.
* Compensation under [no-fault] plans more closely
matches compensation with economic losses-principally
medical costs and wage losses....
* Compensation is more prompt under [no-fault]
coverage.
* [No-fault] laws eliminate compensation for
noneconomic losses-principally pain and suffering-but
only for less serious injuries.
3. But see infra note 5 to app. B (discussing a proposal that denying an insured's right
to claim in tort for noneconomic loss ought to be in lieu of any obligation to insure).
4. This Article defines a no-fault law as one that mandates the purchase of auto insur-
ance payable by one's own insurer for economic loss without reference to fault, and that
also precludes accident victims from recovering noneconomic damages in tort unless they
can prove another person was at fault and their losses exceed a threshold defined by the
no-fault law. Such no-fault laws are distinguished from "add-on" laws, which similarly re-
quire insurers to pay their own injured insureds for economic losses without regard to
fault, but do not limit the right of injured parties to claim for noneconomic loss above any
threshold.
5. In some states, such coverage is termed personal protection insurance, also com-
monly termed "PIP."
6. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1017 (citing STEPHENJ. CARROLL &JAMES S. KAKALIK,
RAND INSTITUTE FOR CVILJUSTICE, No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A POLICY PERSPEC-
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The RAND study tested the effects of eliminating claims for
noneconomic loss no matter how serious the injury, and included its
results in the following table.7
EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD AND PIP BENEFIT LEVEL
ON COSTS AND COMPENSATION 8
1 2 3 4 5 6
Strong Strong Absolute Absolute
Threshold: $ 1,000 $ 1,000 Verbal Verbal Ban Ban
PIP Benefit $15,000 $250,000 $15,000 $250,000 $50,000 Unlimited
Percent change in:
Total injury
coverage costs -12 +13 -22 + 5 -52 -29
Transaction costs -27 -22 39 -34 -83 -80
Net Compensation - 5 +31 -13 +24 -36 - 4
The first four columns of the RAND table show the effect of plans
combining PIP benefits with the right to a tort claim for un-
reimbursed economic losses and for noneconomic losses above the
specified monetary or verbal threshold. Column 1 shows the results of
a $1,000 threshold and a fairly low PIP benefit of $15,000, while col-
umn 2 shows the results of combining the same threshold with a very
high PIP benefit level of $250,000. 9 Columns 3 and 4 display the same
PIP benefit pattern, but with barriers to any claims for noneconomic
TvE at vii (1991). (We have reversed the order of the last two items in our text for reasons
of continuity.)
7. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, NO-FAULT AP-
PROACHES TO COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 32, tbl. 4 (1991),
reprinted in Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1020.
8. RAND examined the effects of six PIP plans, the first four broadly representative of
current laws. Two of the plans (cols. 3 and 4) included what are termed "strong verbal
thresholds" similar to those found in Florida, Michigan, and New York. Under a strong
verbal threshold, traffic victims can seek payment for noneconomic losses only if they
suffer statutorily defined serious injuries. For example, strong verbal thresholds always
include "death," but may also include such injury thresholds as "significant and permanent
loss of an important bodily function," "permanent serious disfigurement," or "permanent
consequential limitation of use of a function or system." Two other plans (cols. 1 and 2)
included a $1,000 threshold that bars traffic victims from seeking compensation for
noneconomic losses unless their medical losses exceed the mandatory threshold. RAND
thus matched a $1,000 threshold with a PIP benefit level of $15,000 (col. 1), and $250,000
(col. 2). But most significant in the earlier RAND study were data indicating the effects of
eliminating all claims for noneconomic loss (cols. 5 and 6), notjust those above a dollar or
verbal threshold, which not one current no-fault law does. All six plans assumed no
deductible against PIP benefits, nor any deduction for collateral sources, such as health
insurance or sick leave.
9. According to RAND, "less than one percent of the people injured in auto accidents
had medical costs in excess of $250,000." CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 32.
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loss unless strong verbal thresholds are breached. Columns 5 and 6
show the results of plans that allow for no payment at all for
noneconomic loss-column 5 with a $50,000 PIP benefit, and column
6 with unlimited PIP benefits.1" Column 5 assumes that persons suf-
fering economic losses above the $50,000 PIP benefit level could seek
compensation for their unreimbursed economic losses above $50,000
through a traditional tort claim."i By hypothesis, there would be no
unreimbursed economic losses in column 6 due to "unlimited" cover-
age of economic losses. Columns 5 and 6 show that very high PIP
benefits can be combined with substantial reductions in total costs.
The RAND figures in column 6 indicate the savings from providing
even unlimited PIP benefits for economic loss coupled with a ban on
all noneconomic losses. 2 The result is savings in personal injury com-
pensation costs of about 29%, which would translate into about half
that percentage savings in total auto premiums, including the pre-
mium components for both personal injury and all car damage. I" But
are such savings substantial enough to mandate by statute that every-
one completely give up tort claims for noneconomic loss?
I. A SYSTEM ALLOWING CHOICE
As we argued in Maryland One, one possible answer to this ques-
tion is a reform that replaces no-fault laws, burdened as they are not
only with payments made without regard to fault for economic losses
up to the limits purchased, but also with expensive-and arguably
even subsidized-claims for noneconomic loss.14  This new reform
could give motorists the option of foregoing claims for noneconomic
loss, without forcing them to do so.15 It would also provide for auto-
matic payment for economic loss at a fixed level. Under this reform,
in no-fault or add-on states, motorists are given the option of purchas-
ing PIP coverage at the state's compulsory insurance level currently
required for tort liability for personal injury (PI). For example, if a
10. For a chart summarizing minimum coverage requirements in all states, PIP benefit
levels in add-on and no-fault states, and thresholds in no-fault states, see infra app. C. See
also AMERICAN INSURANCE ASS'N, SUMMARY OF SELECTED STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS RE-
LATING TO AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 2-11 (1994) (compiling data on state auto insurance
laws).
11. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 32.
12. See supra text accompanying note 7.
13. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1025 n.43; see also infra tbl. 1, col. 1 compared to tbl.
2, col. 5; CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 41.
14. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1026-27. On the subsidy point, see infra text accom-
panying notes 29-48.
15. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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state requires a minimum of $20,000 of PI tort liability, one could
meet that requirement by buying $20,000 of PIP.16 (But just as one
can buy more than the minimum PI coverage, one could also buy
higher PIP limits.) Persons electing such PIP coverage could never
sue nor be sued for noneconomic loss if involved in accidents with any
other motorist, PIP insured or not. Such PIP motorists would only be
allowed to claim in tort against other motorists, whether covered by
PIP or otherwise, for economic loss in excess of their PIP coverage. If
an injury was caused by a tortfeasor's alcohol or drug abuse, however,
there would be no restriction on the right to sue in tort. As to acci-
dents between PIP insureds and those electing to stay in the tort sys-
tem, tort insureds would make a claim against their own insurer for
both economic and noneconomic loss (under coverage termed "tort
maintenance coverage")," just as they do today under uninsured mo-
torist coverage. Tort claims for economic loss in excess of an in-
sured's own tort maintenance coverage would be allowed against PIP
insureds. In accidents between two tort liability insureds, the current
common-law tort system allowing claims for economic and
noneconomic loss would apply without change.
Further details of the proposal are as follows:'" PIP coverage
would be in excess of all collateral sources,' 9 and payable periodi-
cally.2" When claims for economic loss in excess of either PIP or tort
maintenance coverages are pursued, a reasonable attorney's fee in ad-
dition to economic loss would be recoverable." For the purposes of
the cost study in all three articles, we assume no change would be
16. For a listing of each state's minimum required limits of P1 liability coverage that
could be replaced by an equal amount of coverage, see app. C.
17. For a discussion of the controversial philosophical question of whether it is neces-
sary for tort payments to be made by, or even on behalf of, tortfeasors (by their insurers,
for example), see Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Gives One's Neigh-
bors, 77 IowA L. REv. 403, 443-45, 672-74, 677, 698-99, 703-04 (1991). See alsoJULES COLE-
MAN, RisKs AND WRONGS chs. 16, 18, 19 (1992).
18. See generally Maryland One, supra note 1, app. II, at 1045-53 (proposing the terms of
a draft bill to implement this proposal authorizing consumers of motor vehicle insurance
to choose between two options: (1) their present tort remedies under state law, or (2) a
system that combines first-party insurance and the right to sue negligent drivers for all
further uncompensated economic losses). See also app. B for a draft bill applicable only to
current no-fault states.
19. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1027 n.49.
20. But see infra note 72 (discussing data limitations in the RAND studies).
21. This is necessary because, under today's rules, attorney's fees normally come out of
damages paid for pain and suffering. Thus, a regime not paying for pain and suffering
calls for an alternate source for such payment. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1027 n.50.
As to what would be considered a reasonable attorney's fee, see infra notes 7, 12 to app. B.
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made in the law applicable to property damage. In other words, liabil-
ity coverage for property damage claims would still be required."
In Maryland One" we explained the methodology of costing this
new proposal, followed by the percentage effects on premiums for all
states without no-fault laws, with particular emphasis on California, Il-
linois, Louisiana, Ohio, and North Carolina. Maryland Two2 4 went
much further in estimating more precisely the percentage effects in
premiums for every state without no-fault insurance, as well as com-
puting the dollar effects on premiums in such states. Detailed results
were presented for three states-Maryland, California, and Wiscon-
sin-in a manner such that any interested party could develop de-
tailed data for any of the other thirty-two states without no-fault
insurance. Maryland Two?5 also discussed the possible savings avail-
able to low-income motorists, with emphasis on the heavy burdens
placed on them by the high costs of the present tort system.2 6 The
article also briefly discussed the effects the choice plan will have on
deterring unsafe conduct.27
Since Maryland Two,28 RAND has done a further study29 exposing
the flaws inherent in a no-fault system that allows tort claims for
noneconomic damages (usually pain and suffering) for claims above a
threshold. Because pain and suffering damages are generally calcu-
lated as a multiple of medical bills, there is an incentive on the part of
an injured claimant to pad those bills.A° Thus, for every dollar in-
curred in medical bills, an injured party can receive two, three, or
more times as much compensation in pain and suffering damages.
Insurance padding is not only lucrative for claimants, who receive sev-
eral times their economic loss, but also for health care providers (in-
cluding, and perhaps especially, chiropractors) who receive additional
business, and for lawyers who receive their contingent fees out of the
22. The rationale for excluding property damage from no-fault coverage is explained
in ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
280-81 (1965). For a relatively minor change in the bill dealing with car damage and al-
lowing motorists to make the choice proposed herein-but not taken account of in this
cost study-see subsection 14e of the Model Legislation, Maryland Two, supra note 2, app.
B at 341.
23. Maryland One supra note 1.
24. Maryland Two, supra note 2.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 289-93.
27. Id. at 293-94.
28. Id.
29. STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CMILJUSTICE, THE COSTS OF EXCESS
MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES (1995).
30. Id. at 5-6.
1996]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
pain and suffering component." The new RAND study makes a dis-
tinction between "hard" injuries that are objectively verifiable-for ex-
ample, the loss of a limb or a fracture detected by an x-ray-as
opposed to "soft" injuries such as sprains and strains, which are not so
objectively verifiable."2 The latter thus present an opportunity to ex-
aggerate an injury's existence or severity. No-fault auto insurance laws
in effect in New York and Michigan, more than in other states, have
largely taken the profit out of unnecessary medical bills by virtue of
their relatively high verbal thresholds below which claims for pain and
suffering are barred."3 RAND found that in those states seven soft-
injury claims are made for every ten hard-injury ones. 4 In Hawaii,
where a no-fault law with a dollar threshold provides a greater incen-
tive for exaggerating claims, there are nine soft-injury claims for every
ten hard-injury claims."5 In California, a state without any no-fault law
and where the tort system is therefore unimpeded by any barrier to
tort claims, twenty-five soft-injury claims are filed for every ten hard
ones.
3 6
On this score, after Massachusetts amended its automobile no-
fault law in 1988 to require a higher threshold of economic damages
before tort claims would be allowed, the next year the median
number of treatment visits per claim for automobile injuries rose radi-
cally from 13 to 30 per claim, or a 131% increase.3 7 Similarly, a study
by the Insurance Research Council of 1990 auto tort claims in Hawaii
revealed that the median number of treatment visits by claimants to
chiropractors was a remarkable fifty-eight, with one-quarter of such
claimants having more than eighty-four visits.3 8 The graph below
from the new 1995 RAND study shows the distributions of medical
costs for soft-injury claims in Hawaii and New York.3 9 The vertical line
in the graph indicates Hawaii's dollar threshold. The average cost of
soft-injury claims in both states is adjusted for interstate differences in
medical costs and treatment patterns.
31. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 528 n.1 (1986).
32. CARROLL ET At., supra note 29, at 10.
33. See supra note 8.
34. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 29, at 13.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Sarah S. Marter & Herbert I. Weisberg, Medical Expenses and the Massachusetts Auto-
mobile Tort Reform Law: A First Review of 1989 Bodily Injury Liability Claims, 10J. INS. REG. 462,
488, tbl. 12 (1992). Even for fracture treatments, health care visits increased in 1989 by
50% following the higher no-fault threshold law.
38. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTOMOBILE CLAIMS IN HAwAII 2, 16-27 (May 1991).
39. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 29, at 15.
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As can be seen from the graph, the distribution of medical costs
in New York rises quickly, peaks, and then declines sharply to the
right. The large majority of soft-injury claims in New York entails rela-
tively small medical costs, with very few such soft-injury claims exceed-
ing Hawaii's threshold.4"
DISTRBUTION OF ADJUSTED MEDICAL COSTS FOR
SOFT-INJURY CLAIMS IN HAWAII AND NEW YORK
6
New Y rk Hawaii
Percent
ofall
claims 2 /
1 10 100 1000 10,000 100,000
Adjusted medical costs
Hawaii's distribution also rises sharply, flattens out, and then begins to
drop off at a relatively low level of medical costs.41 It then turns up
again, rising sharply through the threshold, and then peaks above the
threshold before finally falling off.
Thus, a substantial portion of Hawaii's soft-injury claims are for
medical costs above its dollar threshold. Compared with New York,
with its strong verbal threshold, the distribution of adjusted medical
costs in Hawaii shifts substantially to the right, as one would expect
given the incentives built into Hawaii's no-fault system." Dollar
thresholds, therefore, seem especially fragile compared to verbal ones.
But the key element-often overlooked by those who urge a New
York-type strong verbal threshold as the cure for inadequate no-fault
40. Id.
41. Note that the horizontal axis is a logarithmic scale: Equal intervals indicate equal
percentage differences. Id.
42. Id. For a report on a Hawaii no-fault auto bill that would have abolished both large
and small claims for noneconomic loss (with no choice of retaining tort coverage in place
of PIP benefits) but was vetoed by the governor, see Alfred Haggerty, Hawaii Legislature Lets
Veto of Pure No-Fault Stand, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Property & Casualty/Risk & Benefit Man-
agement ed.), July 10, 1995, at 2.
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laws-is that even in New York, claims for pain and suffering above its
strong verbal threshold are hugely expensive, contributing dispropor-
tionately to auto insurance costs. As discussed in Maryland One,4" a
good measure of the propensity for personal injury claims to rise is
the change in recent years in the ratio of personal injury (PI) to prop-
erty-damage claims (PD) claims, that is, the PI-PD ratio. In California,
without any no-fault law, that ratio rose steadily from 31.1 PI claims
per 100 PD claims in 1980 to 67.2 per 100 in 1992.4 In New York, on
the other hand, with its relatively strong verbal threshold, the PI-PD
ratio remained very constant at about 11 per 100 from 1980 to 1989.41
But as an illustration of the ill effects of PI tort claims even in New
York, in the late 1980s studies show that its $50,000 of benefits contrib-
uted only 24.6% of the total pure premiums for PI claims. In other
words, the relatively few tort claims preserved over New York's strong
verbal threshold contribute disproportionately (over 75%) to total PI
costs.
4 6
New York, then, has long dealt relatively effectively with higher
costs for smaller tort claims, but it has also long dealt ineffectively with
higher costs for larger tort claims. Arguably the only way to deal with
both is to eliminate claims for noneconomic damages in cases both
large and small.4 7 Furthermore, even in New York, experienced plain-
tiffs' counsel are increasingly exploiting the possibility of suing in tort
above the state's relatively high verbal threshold. This activity has led
to a recent rise of almost 50% in New York's PI-PD ratio from 1989 to
1992 (from 11 per 100 to 15 per 100).48 Thus, simply reducing the
number of tort claims over a strong verbal threshold fails to net opti-
mal savings.
II. A SYSTEM ALLOWING CHOICE AS APPLIED TO ALL FiFrr STATES
Returning to the thesis of this third Article, under a choice system
a state's existing no-fault law is retained both as to the level of PIP
benefits and the tort threshold, except that (save for injuries caused
intentionally or by drugs or alcohol) motorists can elect to end their
rights to claim and be claimed against for noneconomic loss above the
43. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1019-20.
44. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO BODILY INJURY CLAIMS, app. A, tbl.
A-6 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter IRC].
45. Id. at tbl. A-34.
46. See Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1019-20.
47. RAND estimates that nationally, in states like New York with high PIP benefits cou-
pled with a high threshold, almost half of the personal injury premiums go for
noneconomic losses. Id.
48. IRC, supra note 44, at tbl. A-24.
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threshold. There is a corollary reliance on tort maintenance coverage
for noneconomic losses above the threshold for those who prefer in-
surance coverage allowing such claims. Under the plan allowing
choice no one is required to buy PI liability insurance, but those with
assets to protect can be expected to do so.49
This third Article presents actuarial results for all fifty states, in-
cluding those currently with no-fault laws. As in Maryland One ° and
Two,51 we focus here on the effects of the plan allowing choice on the
costs of personal, that is, private passenger, auto insurance. 52 Here as
earlier, we first estimate what auto insurers would have to charge the
average insured motorist to recover the costs incurred in compensat-
ing accident victims under all coverages and limits under the status
quo. We also estimate separately the costs of those buying only
mandatory coverages and limits.53 We then develop corresponding
estimates for motorists who elect to retain the status quo ("stayers")
and for motorists who switch to the new plan allowing choice ("switch-
ers") . We next compare these estimates to determine how the adop-
tion of the plan allowing choice would affect the costs of auto
insurance, depending on whether motorists stay or switch, and
whether they buy more than mandatory coverages.
Under the status quo, motorists can purchase several different
personal injury (PI) coverages at various limits-Bodily Injury (BI) Li-
ability, Uninsured Motorist (UM), including Underinsured Motorist
(UIM), Medical Payments (MedPay), as well as PIP in an add-on or
no-fault state. Accordingly, insured motorists must bear the sum of
the compensation costs of any of those coverages at the limits they
buy. We estimate the compensation cost of the status quo to the aver-
age insured motorist by taking the sum of what insurers pay out plus
49. See infra notes 56-57, 74-75 and accompanying text.
50. Maryland One, supra note 1.
51. Maryland Two, supra note 2.
52. Although this analysis examines only personal auto insurance, this plan would
likely have an even more favorable impact on insurance costs for commercial vehicles.
This is because the liability exposure of commercial vehicles (especially, but not limited to,
large ones) is even greater than for private passenger vehicles. Even more important, traf-
fic victims in commercial vehicles will already be covered by workers' compensation. See
generaly Jeffrey O'Connell, A Model Bill Allowing Choice Between Auto Insurance Payable With
and Without Regard to Fault, 51 OHIo ST. LJ. 947, 968 n.74 (1990).
53. See infra notes 56-57, 75 and accompanying text (discussing option to buy PI liabil-
ity insurance, an option particularly appealing to people with assets to protect).
54. In a traditional tort or add-on state, the switch from the status quo will be to PIP
insurance with abolition of claims for noneconomic loss both by and against the switchers.
In a no-fault state, the switch will be from the status quo to abolition of claims for
noneconomic loss by and against switchers above the threshold; PIP benefits will continue
to cover economic losses up to the limits purchased, just as they do today.
1996] 169
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the associated transactions costs, under all the above applicable cover-
ages and limits, divided by the total number of insured motorists. As
indicated, we also compute the average costs for those buying only
mandatory coverages and limits. Motorists who are uninsured, of
course, bear none of the costs of auto insurance.
Under the plan allowing choice, motorists may remain in their
state's current system (stayers), elect the new choice system (switch-
ers), or be illegally uninsured.55 Stayers will purchase tort mainte-
nance coverage, in addition to BI, and possibly MedPay or UM, and
PIP in an add-on or no-fault state. Following the pattern set forth in
the foregoing paragraph, we estimate the average stayer's compensa-
tion costs under the plan allowing choice as the sum of what auto
insurers pay injured people and the associated transactions costs
under all coverages and limits on behalf of stayers, divided by the total
number of stayers. Note that the average stayer's compensation costs
include the costs insurers incur on an insured's behalf in providing
compensation under PI tort liability type coverages-BI, UM, and tort
maintenance-plus any applicable MedPay coverage, or, in an add-on
or no-fault state, PIP. (All of which, per terminology adopted by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, are subsumed
under the term 'liability,' although technically speaking MedPay and
PIP coverages are not liability-like coverages.56 )
Motorists who switch under the plan allowing choice purchase
not only PIP but may also (although they are not required to)
purchase PI to cover liability claims brought against them by others
for losses in excess of either PIP or tort maintenance policy limits.
Following the pattern set forth above, we estimate the average
switcher's compensation costs as the sum of the costs auto insurers
incur on behalf of such motorists for PIP and, if purchased, BI cover-
age, assuming switchers will not need UM or MedPay57 divided by the
number of insureds. As was the case under the status quo, people who
55. For a proposal allowing motorists to be legally uninsured at the price of losing any
right to claim for noneconomic loss, see infra note 5 to app. B.
56. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, AVERAGE EXPENDITURES &
PREMIUMS IN 1993, at page entitled 'Technical Notes' (Nov. 1995). In this regard, see infra
tables and charts and app. B.
57. PIP insureds are by definition covered for their medical (as well as wage) loss, and
therefore will presumably have no need for MedPay. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at vii-ix.
As for UM, PIP insureds are guaranteed payments for economic loss whether or not the
other driver is insured. Id. at vii.
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go uninsured under the plan allowing choice bear none of the costs of
compensating auto accident victims.58
In addition to the above-mentioned estimates, this Article up-
dates some of the data. The dollar premium figures in Maryland
Two59 were calculated based on those in effect in 1992. (Maryland
One6° did not include premium dollar figures.) The study in this Arti-
cle uses a premium base of 1993. Several other small changes have
been made in the assumptions used, thus making for some relatively
small differences in the calculations even for tort and add-on states.61
III. THE RESULTS
As noted in our earlier articles,6 2 the effects of the plan allowing
choice on premiums charged particular drivers will vary with such fac-
tors as the coverages they buy, their policy limits, their insurer, mile-
age driven, location within the state, and of possibly greater
significance under the reform compared to the present situation, the
type of car driven.65 So here, as before, our estimates are only meant
to indicate the general nature of average cost effects, keeping such
variables in mind.
To summarize Table 1 below, savings for switchers in no-fault
states (those covered by PIP combined with abolition of both large
58. For more on RAND's methodology, see Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1054-59. See
alsO ALLAN ABRAHAMSE & STEPHEN CARROLL, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE EF-
FECTS OF A CHOICE AUTO INSURANCE PLAN ON INSURANCE COSTS at xiii-xv (1995).
59. Maryland Two, supra note 2.
60. Maryland One, supra note 1.
61. All three articles, Maryland One, Maryland Two, and this one, were based on auto
accident data (as opposed to premium data) collected by the Insurance Research Council
in 1987 and published in INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO BODILY INJURY
CLAIMS (1990). The accident data was updated for 1992 and published in IRC, supra note
44. RAND and the authors of this Article hope to update the accident data in this Article
based on the latest IRC data once the requisite statistical adaptations can be funded and
executed. In the meantime, the authors of this Article expect shortly to publish updated
figures in individual state bar journals based on a premium base of 1994, the savings under
which will be even larger than those reported here. We expect the total available dollar
savings to equal over $30 billion versus the $26 billion reported here. See infra tbl. 1, cell
All States/col. 3.
62. Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1029; Maryland Two, supra note 2, at 286.
63. Maryland Two, supra note 2, at 286. On this last point, we reiterate a statement
made in Maryland Two, namely that the first-party character of the plan allowing choice will
permit insurers to calibrate rates for motorists "switching," and under tort maintenance
coverage for those "staying," on the basis of the crashworthy features of the vehicles of
their own insureds, thereby creating a market mechanism to enhance auto safety. Id. at
286. The proposal will thus replace today's third-party system, under which the obligation
of insurers to pay the claims of third parties who sue their insureds makes it infeasible to
fix rates on the basis of the crashworthy features of their own insureds' autos. See Maryland
One, supra note 1, at 1040-41.
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TABLE 1: TOTAL PREMIUM SAVINGS UNDER CHOICE SYSTEMa
1 2 3
Total premium savings for Total available
Total premium savings switchers with low incomes savings
State System for all switchers* (%) and coveragesb* (%) ($ millions)**
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
COC~ c
DE
FL
GAd
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV'
NH
NJg
NM
Tort
Tort
Tort
Add-on
Tort
No-fault
No-fault
Add-on
No-fault
No-fault
No-fault
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
No-fault
No-fault
Tort
Tort
Add-on
No-fault
No-fault
No-fault
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
Tort
No-fault
Tort
19.3%
17.4
37.1
28.2
34.5
30.6
41.0
33.7
31.7
23.8
43.2
27.6
25.1
26.5
25.1
12.4
14.0
44.6
31.0
38.3
41.0
15.4
32.4
24.9
26.0
33.3
25.1
37.4
26.0
35.9
33.3
37.5%
27.9
52.7
47.2
53.0
46.6
57.1
46.9
44.3
41.8
55.4
45.5
45.2
43.7
47.6
22.7
21.4
63.8
50.7
56.0
56.7
27.7
48.9
43.5
43.8
57.4
45.1
54.8
42.2
53.0
52.1
$176
24
533
195
3,622
462
678
93
1,395
484
229
75
772
450
187
53
40
592
114
661
1,154
647
483
137
405
79
113
196
92
1,496
173
NYh No-fault 34.9 53.3 2,334
NC Tort 32.2 46.5 658
ND No-fault 1.5 2.8 -8
OH Tort 28.8 47.0 840
OK Tort 29.3 49.1 278
OR Add-on 29.3 43.0 272
PA! Add-on 31.5 46.8 1,300
RI Tort 28.4 40.8 103
SC Add-on 36.3 52.8 398
SD Add-on 33.5 59.2 61
TN Tort 21.7 38.6 261
TX Add-on 36.1 53.6 1,688
UT No-fault 28.9 45.8 145
VT Tort 21.0 38.0 31
VA Add-on 33.6 49.7 612
WA Add-on 36.8 52.9 621
WV Tort 36.7 58.4 222
WI Tort 31.4 52.5 443
WY Tort 23.5 45.6 31
All States 31.4% 48.1% $26,100
* Assumes 50% switch.
** Assumes 100% switch.
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NOTES TO TABLE I
a. Data are based on laws in effectJanuary 1, 1988. For more com-
plete data on insurance requirements in all 50 states, see infra
app. C.
b. Low-income motorists will likely buy low (only mandatory) cover-
ages, while higher income motorists will likely buy higher (more
than mandatory) coverages. See supra text accompanying note 49
and infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
c. Connecticut repealed its no-fault law on July 29, 1993. The law
had been in effect since 1973. See ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAw 2D § 4:1IA (Supp. 1994).
d. Georgia repealed its no-fault law on October 1, 1991. See id.
§ 4:12.
e. In 1988 Massachusetts amended its threshold no-fault law (effec-
tive January 1, 1989) to increase both the no-fault benefit level
from $2,000 to $8,000 and the threshold dollar amount of medi-
cal expenses for bringing a tort suit from $500 to $2,000. See id.
§ 6:21.
f. Nevada repealed its no-fault law June 5, 1979. See id. § 4:23.
g. In 1988 New Jersey changed from a no-fault system to a modest
plan allowing choice, in which drivers select either no-fault or
tort liability. Motorists choosing no-fault insurance, however,
retain the right to bring claims in tort for noneconomic loss in
serious cases. See id. § 6:24.
h. In June 1995 New York increased the minimum liability require-
ments for BI from $10,000 to $25,000 for each person in an acci-
dent, from $20,000 to $50,000 BI coverage for all persons
involved in the accident, and from $5,000 to $10,000 for property
damage. See Kevin Sack, Rise in Auto Insurance Minimums Is Voted,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1995, at B6.
i. Pennsylvania enacted a modest choice system, in which drivers
could select either no-fault or tort liability, in 1990. Motorists
choosing no-fault insurance retain the right to bring claims in
tort for noneconomic loss in serious cases. SeeJoosT, supra note
c, § 6:28.
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and small pain and suffering claims by and against them) turn out,
like savings for switchers in tort and add-on states, to be very substan-
tial. On the other hand, comparatively speaking, costs for stayers
under the system allowing choice will be only marginally affected in
no-fault states, as was the case in tort and add-on states.
Table 1 presents our findings regarding changes in the costs of
personal auto insurance for every state-tort, add-on, and no-fault.
Column 1 shows the percentage savings in total premiums, including
property damage liability, for all switchers, cumulating those who buy
only mandatory coverage and those who buy more than mandatory
coverage. Column 2 shows percentage savings in total premiums for
switchers who buy only mandatory coverage (almost always those with
lower incomes). As indicated above, mandatory coverage would not
include BI liability coverage nor UM, MedPay, collision or compre-
hensive coverages. 4 Both columns 1 and 2 assume that 50% of mo-
torists switch although-as a comparison between Table 3 in
Appendix A below, columns 1 and 2, and columns 5 and 6, indi-
cates-savings estimates are not greatly altered, except for a few rural
state outliers,65 based on the percentage of switchers.1 Column 3 of
Table 1 shows the total available dollar savings if 100% of motorists
switch. Tables 2 and 3, in Appendix A below, present our findings for
many other categories, including, for example, PI premium percent-
age savings for switchers (Table 2, column 5) and stayers (Table 2,
column 6), and total premium percentage savings for switchers buying
more than mandatory coverage (Table 3, columns 1 and 2) and stay-
ers doing the same (Table 3, columns 3 and 4).
As can be seen from Table 1, switchers would realize significant
savings on personal auto insurance premiums. Cumulating the totals
for both those who buy only the minimum coverage and those who
64. See supra text between notes 56-57.
65. These states are as follows: Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, and North Dakota.
66. Under the system allowing choice proposed herein, insurers can confidently know
that switchers will not be exposed to full liability in tort above the threshold liability, not
only to switchers but to stayers as well. See supra text accompanying note 17. Thus, the
insurer can charge lower premiums to switchers irrespective of how many switch. Under a
scheme of inverse liability, or tort maintenance coverage, in a collision between a stayer
and a switcher, no normal tort claims above the threshold between the motorists are al-
lowed, but the stayer would be allowed to sue his own company for full tort damages as if
his company covered the switcher. Id. Such a regime mirrors uninsured motorist cover-
age, extant today, that allows victims to claim damages against their own companies if the
motorist with whom they collide is uninsured. Under the choice system, the costs of cur-
rent uninsured motorist coverage, including tort maintenance coverage, would increase,
but the increase would be neatly offset by fewer claims against the stayer's tort liability
coverage because switchers would be precluded from full liability claims. See Maryland
Two, supra note 2, at 323-24 n.2 and infra note 3 to app. B.
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purchase more than mandatory coverages,67 switchers would save over
30% on total premiums nationally (Table 1, cell All States/column 1),
with those purchasing only mandatory coverages saving approximately
50% (Table 1, cell All States/column 2). Savings on the order of 20 to
40% would be attained in almost every state (Table 1, column 1). If
all motorists across the country switched, total annual dollars spent on
auto insurance premiums would decline by $26.1 billion (Table 1, cell
All States/column 3). Using New York as an example of an eastern
no-fault state, and again cumulating the totals for both those who do
and do not purchase more than mandatory coverages, we estimate sav-
ings in total premiums for all switchers of 34.9% (Table 1, cell NY/
column 1), and savings of 53.3% (Table 1, cell NY/column 2) for
those who buy only mandatory coverages.6 s If 100% of insureds
switch, a total of $2.3 billion in premium savings would be available in
New York (Table 1, cell NY/column 3). Similarly, in Ohio, as an ex-
ample from a midwestern tort state, we estimate total premium savings
for switchers of 28.8% (Table 1, cell OH/column 1), and savings of
47% for low-income switchers (Table 1, cell OH/column 2), with
available annual savings of over $840 million if 100% switch (Table 1,
cell OH/column 3). As a further example, in Texas, a large south-
western add-on69 state, we estimate total savings for switchers of 36.1%
(Table 1, cell TX/column 1), and savings of 53.6% for low-income
switchers (Table 1, cell TX/column 2). A 100% switch in Texas would
yield over $1.6 billion (Table 1, cell TX/column 3) in annual pre-
mium savings.7°
Of course, such savings for total auto insurance premiums are
remarkably high. The results are particularly noteworthy because they
stem from savings in the 30 to 80% range for personal injury premi-
ums for switchers (Table 2, column 5), with no allowance for any
change in premiums for losses to property. 71 Furthermore, such esti-
mates are arguably conservative.72
67. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 56.
68. See supra text accompanying note 53.
69. See supra note 4.
70. These percentages assume that 50% of drivers will switch. Savings for switchers
assuming 50%, 80%, or 100% of drivers switch remain remarkably constant, except for a
few rural outlier states. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Indeed, this is the pur-
pose of a system of choice with an inverse liability scheme. See Maryland Two, supra note 2,
at 323-24 n.2. Examining the sample state of New York, the RAND data is again illustrative:
assuming 50% of drivers switch, New York switchers would -save 34% on their total premi-
ums; assuming 80% switch, New York switchers would save 34.5%; assuming 100% switch,
New York switchers would save 34.3%.
71. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
72. Maryland Two, supra note 2, at 289.
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IV. EFFECTS ON THE POOR
As we argued in Maryland Two, high auto insurance rates have an
especially harsh impact on the poor.73 As Table 1 indicates, savings
under the plan allowing choice mirror progressive taxation in that
premium reductions will be proportionately higher for the poor. Na-
tionally, switchers buying only the mandatory PIP limits will save an
average of 48.1% on premiums (Table 1, cell All States/column 2).
The savings, as we saw for such switchers in New York (Table 1, cell
NY/column 2), Ohio (Table 1, cell OH/column 2), and Texas (Table
1, cell TX/column 2) are in this range in state after state. These dra-
matic savings occur because the plan frees switchers from any obliga-
tion to buy supplementary PI liability coverage74 -a freedom that
those having few or no assets to protect will embrace. In addition, the
poor generally drive older cars and therefore rarely buy optional colli-
sion or comprehensive coverages. 5
In sum, the choice plan will favorably impact the financial status
of low-income motorists. As pointed out in Maryland Two,76 when less
For example, because of data limitations (see Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1054-
62], we did not consider the effect of making PIP coverage excess to private
health insurance benefits, publicly mandated sources such as Medicare, Medi-
caid, workers' compensation, and private sick leave or disability coverages for
wage loss. Furthermore, premium reductions based on owning safer cars-
brought about by the proposal's first party insurance character-should yield
lower injury rates per accident [a factor not feasible to weigh precisely at this
time]. In addition, because motorists will have less incentive to incur medical
bills and wage loss to inflate claims for pain and suffering [Jeffrey O'Connell &
RobertJoost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA.
L. REV. 61, 70-72 (1986)], those who opt for PIP will have less incentive to pursue
personal injury claims or to utilize medical treatment. However, RAND's esti-
mates do not include this last factor in their primary findings, because its data
lacks a means of precisely weighing reductions resulting from this drop in incen-
tives. [See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 16-17.]
Maryland Two, supra note 2, at 289; see also infra note 75.
73. Maryland Two, supra note 2, at 289-93. For an excerpt from an African-American
Philadelphia newspaper condemning the effect of expensive mandatory coverage require-
ments on low-income individuals, see id. at 289-90.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 49, 56-57, 67 and infra note 75.
75. In this regard, RAND's estimates are again conservative, as they are based on the
premise that anyone choosing PIP coverage would also buy supplementary PI coverage at
the same PI limits they had bought under the traditional tort system. For former tort
insureds who had bought liability coverage to protect their assets, that assumption would
be correct. But many low-income motorists with few or no assets had previously bought PI
only to comply with their state's financial responsibility laws and would be unlikely to
purchase supplementary PI coverage under a choice system. See Maryland Two, supra note
2, at 290.
76. Id. at 290-91.
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affluent motorists insure at all," they currently can spend over 30%78
of their annual household income on auto insurance, and many are
forced to put off buying basic necessities in order to pay their
premiums.79
Moreover, the poor not only pay a large percentage of household
income for auto insurance, but also are likely to pay significantly more
in absolute terms because many reside in urban areas where average
personal auto insurance premiums are much higher than for subur-
ban drivers."0 PIP coverage also assists the poor by providing for more
rapid benefit payments for economic loss than does today's adver-
sarial tort system. Such drivers, lacking independent resources to
cover the costs of their accidents, are often forced under tort law to
accept low settlements because of their need for immediate cash
awards of even modest amounts.8 ' Prompt insurance payments based
on simple proof of injury would be greatly to their advantage.
The choice plan also benefits the poor because it can correlate
premium rates with the likely costs of payout. In rating insureds, in-
surers under today's third-party liability auto insurance only take ac-
count of the likelihood that their insureds will be involved in an
accident, not what their insureds will be paid in that event. Liability
insurers calculate premiums in this way because they do not pay their
own insureds, but instead compensate the unknown persons whom
their insureds might injure in a future accident. As a result, the poor,
as well as the young, are charged very high premiums, even though
their own losses in accidents are comparatively small; for example,
they likely suffer minimal wage loss, if any. Under third-party liability,
the less affluent, along with those with middle incomes, pay into the
insurance pool the same as the more affluent for any given level of
coverage, even though they stand to be paid much less from the
pool. 2 With first-party insurance, the less affluent can at least get
credit for the advantageous side of their risk-that their losses are
likely to be smaller. Finally, the less affluent generally are least likely
77. See, e.g., Gerald Stephens, Please, No More Complaints, 91 Brsr's REIEW (Property/
Casualty Ins. ed.) 61, 63 (Jan. 1991) (stating that 52% of the drivers in Los Angeles carry
no auto insurance). See also infra note 5 to app. B.
78. ROBERT L. MARIL, THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY AUTO INSURANCE UPON LOW INCOME
RESIDENTS OF MARicOPA COUNTY, ARiZONA 8-9, 11 (1993) (finding that 44% of low-income
motorists were forced to postpone buying food to pay their auto insurance premiums); see
also Maryland Two, supra note 2, at 290-91.
79. MARL, supra note 78, at 8-9, 11.
80. See Maryland Two, supra note 2, at 291-92 (contrasting minimum liability premiums
in central Los Angeles and Milwaukee, as opposed to surrounding suburbs).
81. 1I at 291-93.
82. Id.
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to pursue a tort remedy and generally derive the least benefit from
the tort system.83
CONCLUSION
We conclude with the remarks of Professor Edward L. LascherJr.,
a professor of public policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government.
In early 1993, I began studying the battle over automo-
bile insurance reform in the Rhode Island General Assembly.
My original interest was mainly in the legislature itself, and
how decisions might be changing as a result of the more
open process adopted by the leadership of both houses. I
focused on automobile insurance reform, primarily because
it seemed to be a hot issue in the Ocean State.
Yet, as someone with no background in the area, I
found the issue of automobile insurance reform surprisingly
fascinating. It combined many elements of good drama, in-
cluding the spectacle of well-funded interest groups (trial
lawyers and insurance companies) duking it out in public,
and fierce debate about the merits of alternative proposals.
More importantly, the results of these battles really mattered
to ordinary citizens, concerned about high and rising premi-
ums. This was a true "lunch box" issue.
As I became more convinced of the significance of in-
surance reform, I tried to examine as much information as I
could on the subject. I also ventured outside of Rhode Is-
land to review reform efforts in other states, and even in the
Canadian provinces.
What I found has convinced me of the wisdom of...
"choice["] ... legislation ... .' I have come to believe that
this is a reasonable, balanced approach to the chronic prob-
lem of rising premiums-one that can offer drivers meaning-
ful savings.
83. See id. at 293 (commenting on the unfairness of settlement outcomes for the poor).
84. Professor Lascher refers to a bill introduced in the Rhode Island legislature (S.B.
797, 1995 Sess., passed by the Senate and forwarded to the House Committee on Corpora-
tions, where it is pending at the time of this writing; a similar bill, H.B. 6014, Jan. Sess.
(1995), was defeated in that Committee) advocating a system allowing choice of a strong
verbal threshold below which claims for noneconomic damages would be barred-similar
to the existing New York threshold discussed supra note 8 and accompanying text. As
demonstrated above, we think that such a verbal threshold will be far less effective than the
choice system proposed herein. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46. Nevertheless,
Professor Lascher's comments on the deficiencies of the current system and the benefits of
a plan allowing choice apply equally well to the plan proposed herein.
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In my judgment, any discussion of reform legislation
needs to take account of two key facts. The first is that the
auto insurance industry is very competitive, and not unduly
profitable. Numerous firms compete for business. Indeed,
the last figures I saw from A.M. Best Co. showed that the top
three carriers in Rhode Island controlled less than a third of
the market. Also, data from the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners indicate that auto insurance profits
were below the average of other industries from the mid-
1980s through the early 1990s.
This was the very time that many states, including Rhode
Island, were seeing major rate increases, suggesting that
something other than excessive profits was driving the pre-
mium hikes.
A second, and related, critical fact is that major, sustain-
able reductions in insurance premiums require reductions in
claims costs. More bluntly, the total amount of money paid
on behalf of people in automobile accidents needs to be re-
duced. Some premium savings can be achieved through ef-
forts to improve safety (e.g., enforcing seat belt laws) and
combat fraud....
Interestingly, the conclusion about the centrality of re-
ducing claims costs is independent of one's sympathy for in-
surance companies. Many people have reasons to be
irritated with insurance companies, but that doesn't invali-
date the evidence that increases in claims costs precipitate
premium hikes....
It may seem perverse to indicate that premiums can only
be reduced by reducing compensation for accidents. This
argument appears to suggest that rate savings can only be
achieved by a dollar-for-dollar loss of insurance protection.
Yet the seeming perversity of the argument disappears if
we examine where claims costs now go .... Numerous stud-
ies indicate that [the tort] system tends to provide dispropor-
tionate benefits in the form of compensation for "pain and
suffering" to people with minor injuries, often provides inad-
equate compensation for accident victims with serious inju-
ries, and requires large expenditures for legal costs. This
conclusion suggests a tradeoff ....
[G]iven the opportunity, might.., some drivers wish
to opt for full compensation (including reimbursement for
"pain and suffering") .... even if that meant higher premi-
1996]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ums? Might ... some people value their "right to sue" very
highly? Undoubtedly the answer to both questions is yes.
That's the beauty of the "choice system" . . .. Motorists
themselves decide whether they will take a "full tort" option
with higher premiums or "[PIP benefits along with elimina-
tion of claims for pain and suffering]" with lower premiums.
Most important, the choice system avoids the danger of
"free lunch" approaches, such as California's "Proposition
103," which sought to cut rates without cutting claims costs,
and that in large part has never been implemented.
Tempted as we may be by such approaches, most of us real-
ize that a free lunch is an illusion. The best we can hope for
is something that is a relative bargain. A choice ... system
may offer that option for... motorists.8 5
85. Edward L. Lascher Jr., "Choice No-Fault" Insurance May Well Work in Rhode Island,
PROVIDENCE J. BULL., July 9, 1995, at D7.
As a follow-up on Professor Lascher's point that some people perhaps "value their
'right to sue' [for pain and suffering] very highly," id., Professors Steven Croley of Michi-
gan and Jon Hanson of Harvard recently challenged any movement to abolish rights to
noneconomic damages. Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Acci-
dents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Cases, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1785 (1995). Croley and
Hanson particularly emphasized the persistent interest of motorists in purchasing unin-
sured motorist coverage (with its payment based on fault for pain and suffering) as indicat-
ing strong consumer desire for such coverage. Id. at 1862-67. They emphasize that indeed
UM coverage is unique in offering a voluntary choice of tort-based noneconomic damages.
Id. Croley and Hanson thus can be seen as supporting the thesis of this Article, namely to
allow consumers a broader choice between a coverage closely modeled on uninsured mo-
torist coverage (that is, tort maintenance coverage) or to opt out of such coverage for
payment of only economic loss without reference to fault.
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND TREE CHARTS
We present here further documentation of RAND data, support-
ing and expanding on the foregoing material, with scenarios for 50%
and 100% switching to PIP.86 The 100% assumption applies to both a
plan allowing choice and a mandatory plan. The following data in-
clude personal auto insurance premium data for all fifty states, high-
lighting the three above-mentioned states-New York, Ohio, and
Texas.87
Included for these three states are tree-charts that illustrate how
RAND computed the data, accompanied by explanatory notes for
each figure on the tree charts, and preceded by additional tables pro-
viding more of both the input and output figures for and from the
tree charts. By using either the New York, Ohio, or Texas example,
corresponding data, including tree charts and tables, can be formu-
lated for any state.
86. See infra app. A, tbl. 2, cols. 5, 7, and tbl. 3, cols. 1, 2, 5, 6. The savings for switchers
are slightly higher if 50% of motorists switch rather than if 100% switch. This would occur
because switchers must pay the economic loss of the person they tortiously injure above
that person's PIP or tort maintenance coverage. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
With that premise, RAND assumes that stayers will buy tort maintenance coverage at the
same limits that they buy coverage under the present tort system, with many motorists
today buying more than the state financial responsibility limits. On the other hand, RAND
assumes that switchers will buy only minimum PIP insurance limits-which is consistent
with what PIP insureds do today in no-fault states. Thus the exposure of switchers to tort
payment for economic loss above their victims' first-party limits will be somewhat higher as
more motorists switch. See also Maryland Two, supra note 2, app. A n.1.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
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TABLE 2: TREE CHART INPUT DATA
1 2 3. 4 5 6 7
Percent of
column (3)
Collision and that is PI premium PI premium
Comprehensive liability Pesonal savings for savings for PI premimn
Total Premium Premium Total Premium Total Injuy (PI) switchers if stayers if 50% savings if
State ($ millions) ($ions) 1 ($ millions)I Premium 50% switch switch 100% switch
$1,090
198
1,535
713
11,001
1,535
1,729
325
5,182
2,325
567
275
3,318
1,769
776
768
1,146
1,372
375
1,946
3,052
4,207
1,585
641
1,610
239
472
560
430
4,170
597
54.4%
39.4
64.3
70.5
65.4
57.5
75.2
59.4
54.6
58.9
66.7
64.1
63.6
66.2
67.0
36.0
30.6
77.8
72.4
71.8
73.7
30.1
62.7
59.6
67.3
79.7
64.5
66.1
58.7
65.4
66.8
-3.6%
-11.9
-0.9
4.7
1.1
0.1
2.0
-8.4
-3.2
-4.8
-4.3
6.4
2.1
4.5
-7.7
-17.0
-27.0
8.0
4.4
-4.2
-0.2
1.2
1.9
-6.8
4.6
7.5
5.4
1.7
-5.1
3.5
5.1
45.7%
27.2
60.2
68.4
62.4
56.5
71.8
50.3
46.4
51.6
62.3
63.1
58.9
63.5
59.6
19.9
7.6
75.3
71.2
63.7
67.9
30.1
59.0
51.1
65.3
79.7
61.6
61.6
48.4
65.4
65.6
NY 6,807 2,353 4,454 75.0 71.1 1.0 69.9
NC 2,132 655 1,477 71.0 65.5 6.0 62.8
ND 137 63 74 64.0 4.4 -25.0 -17.5
OH 3,241 1,256 1,986 72.0 65.3 -2.5 58.8
OK 1,020 411 609 71.0 69.1 -1.2 64.4
OR 1,096 350 746 77.0 55.8 -7.1 47.4
PA 4,478 1,466 3,012 75.0 62.4 0.7 57.6
RI 454 138 316 78.0 52.3 -7.3 41.7
SC 1,286 402 883 72.0 73.4 -8.2 62.5
SD 182 79 103 74.0 80.0 9.1 80.0
TN 1,381 606 775 68.0 56.8 -1.4 49.35
TX 5,326 1,740 3,586 75.0 71.4 -3.6 62.8
il" 519 191 328 73.0 62.7 2.2 60.8
Vr 184 83 102 71.0 53.5 -8.4 42.4
VA 2,111 683 1,428 75.0 66.2 -4.6 57.2
WA 1,778 541 1,237 79.0 67.0 0.9 63.5
WV 631 235 397 78.0 74.9 7.3 71.8
WI 1,465 590 875 74.0 71.0 3.1 68.5
WY 130 63 67 72.0 63.3 9.9 63.3
All States $89,796 $31,678 $58,117 76.6% 63.4% -0.5% 58.6%
* National Association of Insurance Commissioners, December 1993.
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TABLE 3: TREE CHART OUTPUT DATA
12 1 3 4 5 6
50% SWITCH 100% SWITCH
% Total Premium Savings for % Total Premium Savings for % Total Premium Savings for
Switchers Sta _ _Switchers
Low Income and igher Income Low Income and Hger Income Low Income and figher Income
S cov * and CovCvag and Co Cve and Coverses*
AL 37.5% 16.6% -2.5% -1.1% 31.5% 13.9%
AK 27.9 15.5 -8.5 -4.7 19.3 10.7
AZ 52.7 33.8 -0.7 -0.5 49.4 31.6
AR 47.2 24.9 3.1 1.7 45.9 24.2
CA 53.0 30.9 0.9 0.5 50.5 29.5
CO 46.6 27.5 -0.1 -0.1 45.8 27.0
CT 57.1 37.5 1.5 1.0 54.6 35.8
DE 46.9 30.8 -6.6 -4.4 39.7 26.1
FL 44.3 29.0 -2.6 -1.7 37.6 24.6
GA 41.8 20.8 -3.4 -1.7 36.6 18.2
HI 55.4 40.3 -3.6 -2.6 51.7 37.6
ID 45.5 24.4 4.5 2.4 44.8 24.1
IL 45.2 21.9 1.5 0.7 41.8 20.3
IN 43.7 23.5 3.0 1.6 41.9 22.5
IA 47.6 23.6 -5.4 -2.7 42.3 21.0
KS 22.7 10.8 -10.7 -5.1 12.5 6.0
KY 21.4 12.5 -18.9 -11.1 5.3 3.1
LA 63.8 40.5 6.6 4.2 61.8 39.2
ME 50.7 27.4 3.1 1.7 49.8 27.0
MD 56.0 34.7 -3.3 -2.0 49.7 30.7
MA 56.7 37.6 -0.2 -0.1 52.3 34.6
MI 27.7 13.4 1.1 0.6 27.7 13.4
MN 48.9 29.1 1.5 0.9 46.0 27.4
MS 43.5 21.8 -5.0 -2.5 37.3 18.7
MO 43.8 22.9 3.0 1.6 42.4 22.2
MT 57.4 29.2 5.4 2.8 57.4 29.2
NE 45.1 21.9 3.8 1.8 43.1 20.9
NV 54.8 33.9 1.4 0.9 51.1 31.6
NH 42.2 23.0 -3.7 -2.0 34.8 19.0
NJ 53.0 32.4 2.8 1.7 53.0 32.4
NM 52.1 29.7 3.9 2.3 51.2 29.2
NY 53.3 31.3 0.7 0.4 52.4 30.8
NC 46.5 29.2 4.3 2.7 44.6 28.0
ND 2.8 1.3 -16.0 -7.5 -11.2 -5.2
OH 47.0 25.5 -1.8 -1.0 42.3 23.0
OK 49.1 25.8 -0.8 -0.4 45.7 24.1
OR 43.0 26.4 -5.5 -3.4 36.5 22.4
PA 46.8 28.4 0.5 0.3 43.2 26.2
RI 40.8 25.8 -5.7 -3.6 32.6 20.6
SC 52.8 32.9 -5.9 -3.7 45.0 28.0
SD 59.2 29.3 6.7 3.3 59.2 29.3
TN 38.6 18.9 -1.0 -0.5 33.6 16.5
IX 53.6 32.5 -2.7 -1.7 47.1 28.6
UT 45.8 25.8 1.6 0.9 44.4 25.0
VT 38.0 18.2 -6.0 -2.9 30.1 14.4
VA 49.7 30.3 -3.5 -2.1 42.9 26.2
WA 52.9 33.4 0.7 0.5 50.2 31.7
WV 58.4 32.7 5.7 3.2 56.0 31.3
WI 52.9 27.6 2.3 1.2 50.7 26.7
WY 45.6 20.3 7.1 3.2 45.6 20.3
Ali States 48.6% 28.1% -0.4% -0.2% 44.9% 26.0%
*Low-income motorists will likely buy low (only mandatory) coverages. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 74-75.
** Higher income motorists will likely buy higher (more than mandatory) coverages. See supra text accompanying note 49 and
supr note 75.
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CONSUMER CHOICE FOR AUTO INSURANCE
NOTES FOR TREE CHART A
Relative Savings in New York if 50% Switch
* All dollar figures are in millions
Al. Total 1993 personal auto insurance premiums for New York:
$6,807 (tbl. 2, col. 1).
A2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for
New York: $2,353 (tbl. 2, col. 2). (Collision and comprehen-
sive are complementary physical damage coverages. Collision
covers automobile damage due to collision with any other
object or due to upset. Comprehensive is a catch-all provision
affording coverage for damage caused by a variety of perils
other than collision or upset, e.g., theft, falling objects, fire,
wind, hail, glass breakage, vandalism.)
A3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability) for New York: $4,454 (tbl. 2, col. 3); see
also supra main text note 56 and accompanying text.
A4. The assumption here is that 50% of insured motorists will
switch.
A5. Total premiums for CC coverages for switchers or stayers:
$2,353, supra note A2, multiplied by 50%, supra note A4,
equals $1,176.5.
A6. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums in
New York is 75 to 25. See tbl. 2, col. 4; 25% is the remaining
percentage (100% - 75% = 25%).
A7. Total premiums for PI liability: $4,454, supra note A3, multi-
plied by 75%, supra note A6, equals $3,340.5.
A8. Total premiums for PD liability: $4,454, supra note A3, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note A6, equals $1,113.5.
A9. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorists have higher
income and carry more than mandatory coverage, and 25%
have lower income and carry only mandatory coverage.
A10. Total premiums for PD liability for higher income motorists:
$1,113.5, supra note A8, multiplied by 75%, supra note A9,
equals $835.1.
All. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $1,113.5, supra note A8, multiplied by 25%, supra
note A9, equals $278.3.
A12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for higher income
switchers or stayers: $835.1, supra note A10, multiplied by
50%, supra note A4, equals $417.5.
19961
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A13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
switchers or stayers: $278.3, supra note All, multiplied by
50%, supra note A4, equals $139.1.
A14. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $3,340.5, supra note A7, multiplied by 75%, supra
note A9, equals $2,505.3.
A15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $3,340.5, supra note A7, multiplied by 25%, supra note
A9, equals $835.1.
A16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
switchers or stayers: $2,505.3, supra note A14, multiplied by
50%, supra note A4, equals $1,252.6.
A17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income switch-
ers or stayers: $835.1, supra note A15, multiplied by 50%,
supra note A4, equals $417.5.
A18. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage for switch-
ers in New York equals 71.1% (tbl. 2, col. 5).
A19. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for switchers:
100% minus 71.1%, supra note A18, equals 28.9%.
A20. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage for stayers
in New York equals 1% (tbl. 2, col. 6).
A21. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for stayers:
100% minus 1%, supra note A20, equals 99%.
A22. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
higher income switchers: $1,252.6, supra note A16, multiplied
by 71.1%, supra note A18, equals $890.3.
A23. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
switchers: $1,252.6, supra note A16, multiplied by 28.9%,
supra note A19, equals $362.
A24. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
higher income stayers: $1,252.6, supra note A16, multiplied by
1%, supra note A20, equals $12.5.
A25. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
stayers: $1,252.6, supra note A16, multiplied by 99%, supra
note A21, equals $1,240.
A26. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for low-
income switchers: $417.5, supra note A17, multiplied by
71.1%, supra note A18, equals $296.8.
A27. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income switch-
ers: $417.5, supra note A17, multiplied by 28.9%, supra note
A19, equals $120.6.
186 [VOL. 55:160
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A28. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for low-
income stayers: $417.5, supra note A17, multiplied by 1%,
supra note A20, equals $4.2.
A29. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income stay-
ers: $417.5, supra note A17, multiplied by 99%, supra note
A21, equals $413.3.
A30. The total percent savings for higher income switchers who
choose coverage including collision and comprehensive, P1
liability, and PD liability coverages in New York equals 31.3%
(tbl. 3, col. 2).
A31. The total percent savings for low-income switchers in New
York equals 53.3% (tbl. 3, col. 1).
A32. The total percent savings for higher income stayers who
choose coverage including collision and comprehensive, PI
liability, and PD liability in New York equals 0.4% (tbl. 3, col.
4).
A33. The total percent savings for low-income stayers in New York
equals 0.7% (tbl. 3, col. 3).
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CONSUMER CHOICE FOR AUTO INSURANCE
NOTES FOR TREE CHART B
Relative Savings in New York if 100% Switch
*All dollar figures are in millions
B1. Total 1993 personal auto insurance premiums for New York:
$6,807 (tbl. 2, col. 1).
B2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for
New York: $2,353 (tbl. 2, col. 2). (Collision and comprehen-
sive are complementary physical damage coverages. Collision
covers automobile damage due to collision with any other
object or due to upset. Comprehensive is a catch-all provision
affording coverage for damage caused by a variety of perils
other than collision or upset, e.g., theft, falling objects, fire,
wind, hail, glass breakage, vandalism.)
B3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability) for New York: $4,454 (tbl. 2, col. 3); see
also supra main text note 56 and accompanying text.
B4. The assumption here is that 100% of insured motorists will
switch.
B5. All figures on the tort side of the branches will be zero
because the assumption here is that all insured motorists will
switch.
B6. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists:
$2,353, supra note B2, multiplied by 100%, supra note B4,
equals $2,353.
B7. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums in
New York is 75 to 25. See tbl. 2, col. 4; 25% is the remaining
percentage (100% - 75% = 25%).
B8. Total premiums for PI liability: $4,454, supra note B3, multi-
plied by 75%, supra note B7, equals $3,340.5.
B9. Total premiums for PD liability: $4,454, supra note B3, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note B7, equals $1,113.5.
B10. RAND assumed for all states that 75% of insured motorists
have higher income and carry higher than mandatory cover-
age, and 25% have lower income and carry only mandatory
coverage.
BI 1. Total premiums for PD liability for higher income switchers
and stayers: $1,113.5, supra note B9, multiplied by 75%, supra
note B10, equals $835.1.
B12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $1,113.5, supra note B9, multiplied by 25%, supra
note B10, equals $278.3.
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B13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $835.1, supra note Bll, multiplied by 100%, supra
note B4, equals $835.1.
B14. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $278.3, supra note B12, multiplied by 100%, supra
note B4, equals $278.3.
B15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $3,340.5, supra note B8, multiplied by 75%, supra
note BIO, equals $2,505.3.
B16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $3,340.5, supra note B8, multiplied by 25%, supra note
BiO, equals $835.1.
B17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists where all insureds switch: $2,505.3, supra note B15,
multiplied by 100%, supra note B4, equals $2,505.3.
B18. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists where all insureds switch: $835.1, supra note B16, multi-
plied by 100%, supra note B4, equals $835.1.
B19. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage in New
York equals 69.9% (tbl. 2, col. 7).
B20. Total premium multiple for personal (PI) liability coverage
for insured motorists: 100% minus 69.9%, supra note B19,
equals 30.1%.
B21. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
higher income motorists: $2,505.3, supra note B17, multiplied
by 69.9%, supa note B19, equals $1,751.2.
B22. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $2,505.3, supra note B17, multiplied by 30.1%,
supra note B20, equals $754.1.
B23. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for low-
income motorists: $835.1, supra note B18, multiplied by
69.9%, supra note B19, equals $583.7.
B24. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $835.1, supra note B18, multiplied by 30.1%, supra note
B20, equals $251.4.
B25. The total percent savings for higher income motorists who
choose coverage including collision and comprehensive, PI
liability, and PD liability coverages in New York equals 30.8%
(tbl. 3, col. 6).
B26. The total percent savings for low-income motorists in New
York equals 52.4% (tbl. 3, col. 5).
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CONSUMER CHOICE FOR AUTO INSURANCE
NOTES FOR TREE CHART C
Relative Savings in Ohio if 50% Switch
*All dollar figures are in millions
C1. Total 1993 personal auto insurance premiums for Ohio:
$3,241 (tbl. 2, col. 1).
C2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for
Ohio: $1,256 (tbl. 2, col. 2). (Collision and comprehensive
are complementary physical damage coverages. Collision cov-
ers automobile damage due to collision with any other object
or due to upset. Comprehensive is a catch-all provision afford-
ing coverage for damage caused by a variety of perils other
than collision or upset, e.g., theft, falling objects, fire, wind,
hail, glass breakage, vandalism.)
C3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability) for Ohio: $1,986 (tbl. 2, col. 3); see also
supra main text note 56 and accompanying text.
C4. The assumption here is that 50% of insured motorists will
switch.
C5. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists who
switch or stay: $1,256, supra note C2, multiplied by 50%, supra
note C4, equals $628.
C6. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums in
Ohio is 72 to 28. See tbl. 2, col. 4; 28% is the remaining per-
centage (100% - 72% = 28%).
C7. Total premiums for PI liability: $1,986, supra note C3, multi-
plied by 72%, supra note C6, equals $1,429.9.
C8. Total premiums for PD liability: $1,986, supra note C3, multi-
plied by 28%, supra note C6, equals $556.1.
C9. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorists have higher
income and carry higher than mandatory coverage, and 25%
have lower income and carry only mandatory coverage.
C1O. Total premiums for PD liability for higher income motorists:
$556.1, supra note C8, multiplied by 75%, supra note C9,
equals $417.1.
Cll. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $556.1, supra note C8, multiplied by 25%, supra
note C9, equals $139.
C12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for higher income
motorists who switch or stay: $417.1, supra note CIO, multi-
plied by 50%, supra note C4, equals $208.5.
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C13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
switchers or stayers: $139, supra note C11, multiplied by 50%,
supra note C4, equals $69.5.
C14. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $1,429.9, supra note C7, multiplied by 75%, supra
note C9, equals $1,072.4.
C15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $1,429.9, supra note C7, multiplied by 25%, supra note
C9, equals $357.5.
C16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists who switch or stay: $1,072.4, supra note C14, multi-
plied by 50%, supra note C4, equals $536.2.
C1 7. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income switch-
ers or stayers: $357.5, supra note C15, multiplied by 50%,
supra note C4, equals $178.7.
C18. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage for switch-
ers in Ohio equals 65.3% (tbl. 2, col. 5).
C19. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for switchers:
100% minus 65.3%, supra note C18, equals 34.7%.
C20. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage for stayers
in Ohio equals -2.5% (tbl. 2, col. 6).
C21. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who stay: 100% minus -2.5%, supra note C20, equals
102.5%.
C22. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
higher income switchers: $536.2, supra note C16, multiplied
by 65.3%, supra note C18, equals $350.1.
C23. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
switchers: $536.2, supra note C16, multiplied by 34.7%, supra
note C19, equals $186.1.
C24. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
motorists who stay with higher than mandatory coverage:
$536.2, supra note C16, multiplied by -2.5%, supra note C20,
equals -$13.4.
C25. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists who stay
with higher than mandatory coverage: $536.2, supra note C16,
multiplied by 102.5%, supra note C21, equals $549.6.
C26. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
insured motorists who switch with only mandatory coverage:
$178.7, supra note C17, multiplied by 65.3%, supra note C18,
equals $116.7.
[VOL. 55:160
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C27. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
who switch with only mandatory coverage: $178.7, supra note
C17, multiplied by 34.7%, supra note C19, equals $62.
C28. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
motorists who stay with only mandatory coverage: $178.7,
supra note C17, multiplied by -2.5%, supra note C20, equals -
$4.5.
C29. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists who stay
with only mandatory coverage: $178.7, supra note C17, multi-
plied by 102.5%, supra note C21, equals $183.2.
C30. The total percent savings for insured motorists who switch
with higher than mandatory coverage including collision and
comprehensive, PI liability, and PD liability coverages in Ohio
equals 25.5% (tbl. 3, col. 2).
C31. The total percent savings for insured motorists who switch
with only mandatory coverage in Ohio equals 47% (tbl. 3, col.
1).
C32. The total percent savings for insured motorists who stay with
higher than mandatory coverage including collision and com-
prehensive, PI liability, and PD liability in Ohio equals -1%
(tbl. 3, col. 4).
C33. The total percent savings for insured motorists who stay with
only mandatory coverage in Ohio equals -1.8% (tbl. 3, col. 3).
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CONSUMER CHOICE FOR AUTO INSURANCE
NOTES FOR TREE CHART D
Relative Savings in Ohio if 100% Switch
*All dollar figures are in millions
Dl. Total 1993 personal auto insurance premiums for Ohio:
$3,241 (tbl. 2, col. 1).
D2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for
Ohio: $1,256 (tbl. 2, col. 2). (Collision and comprehensive
are complementary physical damage coverages. Collision cov-
ers automobile damage due to collision with any other object
or due to upset. Comprehensive is a catch-all provision afford-
ing coverage for damage caused by a variety of perils other
than collision or upset, e.g., theft, falling objects, fire, wind,
hail, glass breakage, vandalism.)
D3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (P1) plus property
damage (PD) liability) for Ohio: $1,986 (tbl. 2, col. 3); see also
supra main text note 56 and accompanying text..
D4. The assumption here is that 100% of insured motorists will
switch.
D5. All figures on the tort side of the branches will be zero
because the assumption here is that all insured motorists will
switch.
D6. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists:
$1,256, supra note D2, multiplied by 100%, supra note D4,
equals $1,256.
D7. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums in
Ohio is 72 to 28. See tbl. 2, col. 4; 28% is the remaining per-
centage (100% - 72% = 28).
D8. Total premiums for PI liability: $1,986, supra note D3, multi-
plied by 72%, supra note D7, equals $1,429.9.
D9. Total premiums for PD liability: $1,986, supra note D3, multi-
plied by 28%, supra note D7, equals $556.1.
D10. RAND assumed for all states that 75% of insured motorists
have higher income and carry higher than mandatory cover-
age and 25% have lower income and carry only mandatory
coverage.
Dll. Total premiums for PD liability for higher income motorists:
$556.1, supra note D9, multiplied by 75%, supra note D1O,
equals $417.1.
D12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $556.1, supra note D9, multiplied by 25%, supra
note D10, equals $139.
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D13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $417.1, supra note Dll, multiplied by 100%, supra
note D4, equals $417.1.
D14. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $139, supra note D12, multiplied by 100%, supra
note D4, equals $139.
D15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $1,429.9, supra note D8, multiplied by 75%, supra
note D10, equals $1,072.4.
D16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $1,429.9, supra note D8, multiplied by 25%, supra note
D10, equals $357.5.
D17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists where all insureds switch: $1,072.4, supra note D15,
multiplied by 100%, supra note D4, equals $1,072.4.
D18. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists where all insureds switch: $357.5, supra note D16, multi-
plied by 100%, supra note D4, equals $357.5.
D19. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage in Ohio
equals 58.8% (tbl. 2, col. 7).
D20. Total premium multiple for personal (PI) liability coverage
for insured motorists: 100% minus 58.8%, supra note D19,
equals 41.2%.
D21. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
higher income motorists: $1,072.4, supra note D17, multiplied
by 58.8%, supra note D19, equals $630.6.
D22. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $1,072.4, supra note D17, multiplied by 41.2%,
supra note D20, equals $441.8.
D23. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for low-
income motorists: $357.5, supra note D18, multiplied by
58.8%, supra note D19, equals $210.2.
D24. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $357.5, supra note D18, multiplied by 41.2%, supra note
D20, equals $147.3.
D25. The total percent savings for higher income motorists who
choose coverage including collision and comprehensive, PI
liability, and PD liability coverages in Ohio equals 23% (tbl. 3,
col. 6).
D26. The total percent savings for low-income motorists in Ohio
equals 42.3% (tbl. 3, col. 5).
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CONSUMER CHOICE FOR AUTO INSURANCE
NOTES FOR TREE CHART E
Relative Savings in Texas if 50% Switch
*All dollar figures are in millions
El. Total 1993 personal auto insurance premiums for Texas:
$5,326 (tbl. 2, col. 1).
E2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for
Texas: $1,740 (tbl. 2, col. 2). (Collision and comprehensive
are complementary physical damage coverages. Collision cov-
ers automobile damage due to collision with any other object
or due to upset. Comprehensive is a catch-all provision afford-
ing coverage for damage caused by a variety of perils other
than collision or upset, e.g., theft, falling objects, fire, wind,
hail, glass breakage, vandalism.)
E3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability) for Texas: $3,586 (tbl. 2, col. 3); see also
supra main text note 56 and accompanying text..
E4. The assumption here is that 50% of insured motorists will
switch.
E5. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists who
switch or stay: $1,740, supra note E2, multiplied by 50%, supra
note E4, equals $870.
E6. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums in
Texas is 75 to 25. See tbl. 2, col. 4; 25% is the remaining per-
centage (100% - 75% = 25%).
E7. Total premiums for PI liability: $3,586, supra note E3, multi-
plied by 75%, supra note E6, equals $2,689.5.
E8. Total premiums for PD liability: $3,586, supra note E3, multi-
plied by 25%, supra note E6, equals $896.5.
E9. RAND assumed that 75% of insured motorists have higher
income and carry higher than mandatory coverage, and 25%
have lower income and carry only mandatory coverage.
ElO. Total premiums for PD liability for higher income motorists:
$896.5, supra note ES, multiplied by 75%, supra note E9,
equals $672.4.
Eli. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $896.5, supra note E8, multiplied by 25%, supra
note E9, equals $224.1.
E12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for higher income
motorists who switch or stay: $672.4, supra note El0, multi-
plied by 50%, supra note E4, equals $336.2.
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E13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
switchers or stayers: $224.1, supra note Ell, multiplied by
50%, supra note E4, equals $112.
E14. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $2,689.5, supra note E7, multiplied by 75%, supra
note E9, equals $2,017.1.
E15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $2,689.5, supra note E7, multiplied by 25%, supra note E9,
equals $672.4.
E16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists who switch or stay: $2,017.1, supra note E14, multi-
plied by 50%, supra note E4, equals $1,008.5.
E17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income switch-
ers or stayers: $672.4, supra note El5, multiplied by 50%,
supra note E4, equals $336.2.
E18. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage for
insured motorists who switch in Texas equals 71.4% (tbl. 2,
col. 5).
E19. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who switch: 100% minus 71.4%, supra note E18,
equals 28.6%.
E20. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage for stayers
in Texas equals -3.6% (tbl. 2, col. 6).
E21. Total premium multiple for PI liability coverage for insured
motorists who stay: 100% minus -3.6%, supra note E20, equals
103.6%.
E22. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
insured motorists who switch with higher than mandatory cov-
erage: $1,008.5, supra note E16, multiplied by 71.4%, supra
note E18, equals $720.1.
E23. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
who switch with higher than mandatory coverage: $1,008.5,
supra note E16, multiplied by 28.6%, supra note E19, equals
$288.4.
E24. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
motorists who stay with higher than mandatory coverage:
$1,008.5, supra note E16, multiplied by -3.6%, supra note E20,
equals -$36.3.
E25. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists who stay
with higher than mandatory coverage: $1,008.5, supra note
E16, multiplied by 103.6%, supra note E21, equals $1,044.8.
E26. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
insured motorists who switch with only mandatory coverage:
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$336.2, supra note E17, multiplied by 71.4%, supra note E18,
equals $240.
E27. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for insured motorists
who switch with only mandatory coverage: $336.1, supra note
E17, multiplied by 28.6%, supra note E19, equals $96.2.
E28. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
motorists who stay with only mandatory coverage: $336.2,
supra note E17, multiplied by -3.6%, supra note E20, equals -
$12.1.
E29. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for motorists who stay
with only mandatory coverage: $336.2, supra note E17, multi-
plied by 103.6%, supra note E21, equals $348.3.
E30. The total percent savings for insured motorists who switch
with higher than mandatory coverage including collision and
comprehensive, PI liability, and PD liability coverages in Texas
equals 32.5% (tbl. 3, col. 2).
E31. The total percent savings for insured motorists who switch
with only mandatory coverage in Texas equals 53.6% (tbl. 3,
col. 1).
E32. The total percent savings for insured motorists who stay with
higher than mandatory coverage including collision and com-
prehensive, PI liability, and PD liability in Texas equals -1.7%
(tbl. 3, col. 4).
E33. The total percent savings for insured motorists who stay with
only mandatory coverage in Texas equals -2.7% (tbl. 3, col. 3).
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NOTES FOR TREE CHART F
Relative Savings in Texas if 100% Switch
*All dollar figures are in millions
Fl. Total 1993 personal auto insurance premiums for Texas:
$5,326 (tbl. 2, col. 1).
F2. Total premiums for collision and comprehensive (CC) for
Texas: $1,740 (tbl. 2, col. 2). (Collision and comprehensive
are complementary physical damage coverages. Collision cov-
ers automobile damage due to collision with any other object
or due to upset. Comprehensive is a catch-all provision afford-
ing coverage for damage caused by a variety of perils other
than collision or upset, e.g., theft, falling objects, fire, wind,
hail, glass breakage, vandalism.)
F3. Total liability premiums (personal injury (PI) plus property
damage (PD) liability) for Texas: $3,586 (tbl. 2, col. 3); see also
supra main text note 56 and accompanying text..
F4. The assumption here is that 100% of insured motorists will
switch.
F5. All figures on the tort side of the branches will be zero
because the assumption here is that all insured motorists will
switch.
F6. Total premiums for CC coverages for insured motorists:
$1,740, supra note F2, multiplied by 100%, supra note F4,
equals $1,740.
F7. The ratio of PI liability premiums to PD liability premiums in
Texas is 75 to 25. See tbl. 2, col. 4; 25% is the remaining per-
centage (100% - 75% = 25%).
F8. Total premiums for PI liability: $3,585.7, supra note F3, multi-
plied by 75%, supra note F7, equals $2,689.5.
F9. Total premiums for PD liability: $3,585.7, supra note F3, mul-
tiplied by 25%, supra note F7, equals $896.5.
F10. RAND assumed for all states that 75% of insured motorists
have higher income and carry higher than mandatory cover-
age and 25% have lower income and carry only mandatory
coverage.
F1 1. Total premiums for PD liability for higher income motorists:
$896.5, supra note F9, multiplied by 75%, supra note F10,
equals $672.4.
F12. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $896.5, supra note F9, multiplied by 25%, supra
note F10, equals $224.1.
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F13. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $672.4, supra note F1l, multiplied by 100%, supra
note F4, equals $672.4.
F14. Total premiums for PD liability coverage for low-income
motorists: $224.1, supra note F12, multiplied by 100%, supra
note F4, equals $224.1.
F15. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $2,689.5, supra note F8, multiplied by 75%, supra
note F1O, equals $2,017.1.
F16. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $2,689.5, supra note F8, multiplied by 25%, supra note
F10, equals $672.4.
F17. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists where all insureds switch: $2,017.1, supra note F15,
multiplied by 100%, supra note F4, equals $2,017.1.
F18. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists where all insureds switch: $672.4, supra note F16, multi-
plied by 100%, supra note F4, equals $672.4.
F19. Percent of premium savings for PI liability coverage in Texas
equals 62.8% (tbl. 2, col. 7).
F20. Total premium multiple for personal (PI) liability coverage
for insured motorists: 100% minus 62.8%, supra note F19,
equals 37.2%.
F21. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for
higher income motorists: $2,017.1, supra note F17, multiplied
by 62.8%, supra note F19, equals $1,266.7.
F22. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for higher income
motorists: $2,017.1, supra note F17, multiplied by 37.2%,
supra note F20, equals $750.4.
F23. Total dollar savings available for PI liability coverage for low-
income motorists: $672.4, supra note F18, multiplied by
62.8%, supra note F19, equals $422.3.
F24. Total premiums for PI liability coverage for low-income motor-
ists: $672.4, supra note F18, multiplied by 37.2%, supra note
F20, equals $250.1.
F25. The total percent savings for higher income motorists who
choose coverage including collision and comprehensive, PI
liability, and PD liability coverages in Texas equals 28.6% (tbl.
3, col. 6).
F26. The total percent savings for low-income motorists in Texas
equals 47.1% (tbl. 3, col. 5).
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APPENDIX B: MODEL LEGISLATION FOR CREATION OF CONSUMER
CHOICE IN MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE IN A STATE WITH
NO-FAULT INSURANCE'
AN ACT relating to insurance; creating a system of motor vehicle in-
surance that offers a choice of methods of claiming for losses from
personal injury above the tort threshold arising out of the mainte-
nance or use of motor vehicles; abolishing tort liability in certain
cases; and providing other matters properly relating thereto:
CONSUMER CHOICE IN MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT
SECTION 1. TITLE
SECTION 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS
SECTION 4. INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 5. ELECTION OF TORT WAIVER OPTION OR TORT MAINTE-
NANCE OPTION
SECTION 6. APPLICATION OF COVERAGE
SECTION 7. TORT' RIGHTS AND LEGAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS ACT
SECTION 8. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS TO TORT MAINTENANCE COVERAGE
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF [NAME], REPRESENTED IN THEIR
LEGISLATURE, Do ENACT AS FoLLows:
SECTION 1. TITLE. This Act may be cited as the Consumer
Choice in Motor Vehicle Insurance Act.2
SECTION 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.3
a. Tort Liability Insurance versus Personal Injury Protection4
coverage.
(1) Motorists who choose the Tort Maintenance Option and
who are involved in an accident with another motorist remain under
1. This Model Legislation is authored by Jeffrey O'Connell.
2. This generic bill incorporates a state's current no-fault law and thus is considerably
shorter than the bill included in Maryland Two, supra main text note 2, at 321, which as-
sumes that a no-fault law is not in effect.
3. A pivotal requirement of any law allowing motorists to choose to waive tort rights to
noneconomic damages above the state's no-fault law threshold is the proper allocation of
benefits from the surrender of tort rights.
To illustrate the problem, consider the impact of the possible combinations of insur-
ance coverages as to noneconomic damages above the threshold in a two-car collision: (1)
both vehicles could be covered by insurance waiving tort rights; (2) both vehicles could be
covered by insurance retaining tort rights; or (3) one vehicle could be covered by insur-
ance waiving tort rights and the other by insurance retaining tort rights.
As to the various means for resolving the proper allocation of costs under a choice
scheme, see id. at 323-24 n.2.
4. See supra main text note 85.
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the tort system above the tort threshold, except that, based on fault
they (a) can be sued by those who choose the Tort Waiver Option
only for uncompensated economic losses in excess of the limits of the
Personal Injury Protection (PIP) policy, and (b) cannot claim against
those who choose Tort Waiver Coverage except for uncompensated
economic loss in excess of the limits of their own first-party Tort Main-
tenance Coverage.
(2) Motorists who choose the Tort Waiver Option lose the right
to claim and sue for "pain and suffering" and other noneconomic loss
above the tort threshold, but if they suffer economic loss in excess of
their PIP policy's benefit levels, they retain the right to claim for un-
compensated economic loss based on fault.
(3) When two motorists who each choose Tort Maintenance
Coverage are involved in an accident with each other, their rights
against each other above the tort threshold are unaffected by this Act.
(4) If motorists who have chosen Tort Maintenance Insurance
are involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist, they will be
compensated for losses above the tort threshold under any uninsured
motorist provisions of their own policy based on fault and have an
unlimited right to claim for damages based on fault. Uninsured mo-
torists forfeit the right to claim above the tort threshold for
noneconomic loss against motorists who have chosen Tort Mainte-
nance Insurance.5
5. SeeJeffrey O'Connell, Allowing Motorists a Choice to Be Legally Uninsured by Surrender-
ing Tort Claims for Noneconomic Loss (With Some Further Thoughts on Choices Between PIP and
Tort Coverage), 1 CONN. INS. LJ. 33 (1995) (proposing that denial of an uninsured's right to
claim in tort for noneconomic loss ought to replace any obligation, or other punishment,
for failure to insure).
What is the potential interaction between the proposal to allow motorists to be legally
uninsured at the price of surrendering claims for either PIP or noneconomic loss in tort
and the proposal herein for making optional Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage an
alternative to requiring purchase of personal injury liability insurance? In addition to two
choices for personal injury coverage (tort or PIP), motorists will have a third way to meet
the law's demands by surrendering their claims for noneconomic loss and insuring neither
for PIP nor for tort liability coverage. In this connection, a further alternative would en-
able relatively affluent motorists with adequate collateral sources to forgo even PIP cover-
age and to insure only for tort liability with a provision for abandonment of claims for pain
and suffering both by and against themselves. (For a further feature that could be applica-
ble to those waiving claims for noneconomic losses, see infra note 11 to Model Legislation
and accompanying text.) This might be an attractive alternative, for example, for retired
individuals with adequate pension coverage for their wage loss and adequate health insur-
ance from their retirement plans and Medicare.
Thus, the following categories of motorists would comply with a financial responsibil-
ity law so far as it pertains to personal injury: (1) motorists buying Tort Maintenance Cover-
age for personal injury; (2) motorists buying PIP coverage (with motorists in categories (1)
and (2) perhaps buying Tort Liability Coverage also, mostly to cover economic loss); (3)
motorists buying only Tort Liability Coverage, but waiving their claims for pain and suffer-
ing; and (4) motorists buying neither tort coverage nor PIP.
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(5) If motorists who have chosen the Tort Waiver Policy are in-
volved in an accident with an uninsured motorist, they will be
promptly compensated for losses without regard to fault under their
Personal Injury Protection policy, and have an unlimited right to
claim for damages based on fault. The uninsured motorist forfeits the
right to claim for noneconomic loss against the motorist who has cho-
sen the Tort Waiver Policy.
6
(6) Recovery of uncompensated economic loss includes reason-
able expenses incurred by the party in collecting such benefits, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee for advising and representing a
claimant for such loss. No part of the fee for representing a claimant
in connection with such loss is a charge against payment otherwise
due the claimant, and no additional fee may be charged by an attor-
ney to any party in collecting for such loss. All or part of the fee may
be deducted from payment otherwise due the claimant if any signifi-
cant part of the claim for such loss was fraudulent or so excessive as to
have no reasonable foundation.7 In any claim brought against an in-
The consequences of each choice would be as follows:
(1) For motorists buying at least the minimum of Tort Liability coverage, their rights
to claim and to be claimed against when they collide with another motorist in this category
remain as they are at common law. Such motorists colliding with a PIP motorist claim
against their own insurer for common-law damages, including noneconomic losses, under
tort maintenance coverage, with the further right to claim against a PIP motorist for un-
compensated economic loss, plus attorney's fees, above their own first-party inverse liability
coverage.
PIP motorists, buying at least the minimum of PIP coverage and, colliding with an-
other PIP or tort motorist, receive PIP benefits without reference to fault to the extent of
the PIP coverage purchased, and can claim in tort against either a PIP or tort motorist for
economic loss above their own PIP coverage.
In any of the above instances, any tort right against a motorist insured only for PIP
would be relatively worthless, with these results under the other three categories of
motorists:
(2) For motorists who purchased either PIP or Tort Maintenance Insurance, their
right to claim in tort for economic loss above their own first-party coverage (whether tort
or PIP) would be redeemable as a practical matter only to the extent of another motorist's
third-party Tort Liability Coverage.
(3) Motorists buying only Tort Liability Insurance but waiving their right to claim for
noneconomic loss are solely dependent on their own collateral sources for payment of
economic loss. To the extent that such sources are inadequate, these motorists can claim
in tort for excess economic loss-with that right also, as a practical matter, only redeem-
able to the extent of the other motorist's third-party liability insurance.
(4) Motorists buying neither liability insurance nor PIP, only can claim in tort for
economic loss against any other motorist.
In all of the above situations, motorists, regardless of how or whether insured, retain
claims for both economic and noneconomic losses against any motorist guilty of inten-
tional, drunken, or illegally drugged misconduct. See supra main text between notes 16-17.
6. See supra note 5 to Model Legislation.
7. Because payment is made only for a claimant's economic loss, unless a claimant's
attorney's fees were paid in addition to the damages, attorney's fees would come out of the
claimant's pocket. We assume the fee would be one-third of the amount due. But see infra
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jured person by a Personal Injury Protection Insurer, the court may
award the injured person's attorney a reasonable attorney's fee for
defending the action if the injured person was the prevailing party.'
b. No tort rights above the tort threshold are ever lost against a
motorist driving under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs or
guilty of intentional misconduct.
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS. As used in this Act, unless the context
requires otherwise, the following terms have the meaning ascribed to
them in this section:
a. "Economic loss" means medical expenses, loss of income
from work, replacement services loss,9 and funeral expenses incurred
by or on behalf of an injured person as the result of an accidental
personal injury to such injured person.
b. "Resident relative" means a person related to the owner of a
motor vehicle by blood, marriage, adoption, or otherwise, and resid-
ing in the same household. A person resides in the same household if
he or she usually makes his or her home in the same family unit, even
though temporarily living elsewhere.
c. "Tort Maintenance Coverage" means coverage under which
persons who have elected such option, when involved in an accident
with an insured who has chosen the Tort Waiver Option, claim for
liability above the tort threshold against their own insurer to the ex-
tent of such coverage.
d. "Uncompensated economic loss" means that portion of eco-
nomic loss arising out of an accidental personal injury of an injured
person that exceeds any benefits provided by (i) Personal Injury Pro-
tection coverage, (ii) Tort Maintenance Coverage, or (iii) collateral
sources.
SECTION 4. INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS. An insurance policy writ-
ten by a motor vehicle liability insurer pursuant to this Act to provide
coverage under the Tort Maintenance Option includes thereby cover-
age for accidental personal injury of an insured under the Tort Main-
tenance Option caused by the negligence, in whole or in part, of an
insured under the Tort Waiver Option. Such insurance will pay such
damages as might have been recovered against a Tort Waiver Insured
note 12 to Model Legislation (discussing an alternate proposal in which, under certain
circumstances, attorney's fees would be capped at 10% of the award).
8. Thus, if an insurer brought an action against a claimant for failing to undertake
reasonable employment, the claimant would be awarded attorney's fees if he prevailed in
the litigation.
9. Replacement services cover the costs of services affected by the injury, for example,
when the spouse of an injured party must alter his schedule to care for the couple's
children.
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but for the exemption from tort liability provided by section 7 up to
the liability limits of the Tort Maintenance Coverage.
SECTION 5. ELECTION OF TORT WAIVER OPTION OR TORT MAINTE-
NANCE OPTION.10 Upon the earliest and first renewal of any applicable
motor vehicle liability insurance policy on or after the effective date of
this Act, or before the issuance of a policy required by this Act, a
choice must be made of either the Tort Maintenance or the Tort
Waiver Option. In order to minimize conflict between the two op-
tions, motor vehicle insurers are authorized to maintain underwriting
rules that encourage uniformity within a household. A choice made
pursuant to this Act is binding with respect to any continuation, re-
newal, or reinstatement of an applicable motor vehicle insurance pol-
icy, and continues with respect to any policy that extends, supersedes,
or replaces the policy unless the named insured subsequently makes a
different choice in writing.
SECTION 6. APPLICATION OF COVERAGE.
a. If there is only one vehicle owned by the named insured or
any member of the household of the named insured, the choice made
by the named insured under section 7 is applicable to his or her
spouse and to any resident relatives of the household. That choice
also applies to all persons insured under the policy while occupying
other motor vehicles or if struck by another motor vehicle.
b. If there is more than one motor vehicle in the household,
and the named insured chooses different options for different vehi-
cles, the choice applicable to the vehicle in use governs not only the
named insured, but also all other persons insured under the policy
whose injury arises out of the use of that motor vehicle unless the
named insured has specifically identified resident relatives to be Tort
Waiver Insureds. If the named insured is injured while occupying or
by being struck by another motor vehicle, the Tort Maintenance Op-
tion is applicable. If any other person insured under two or more
policies covering different options is injured while occupying or by
being struck by another motor vehicle, and that insured has not been
specifically identified by the named insured as being a Tort Waiver
Insured at all times, the Tort Maintenance Option is applicable.
c. If there are two or more vehicles in the household, each
owned by different persons, each such person has the right to choose
10. This section requires motorists to elect between the Tort Waiver System and the
Tort Maintenance System for claims for noneconomic loss above the tort threshold. It
establishes procedures for such elections and for establishing the effective date of such
elections. It also provides that a motor vehicle insurer may encourage that all the motor
vehicle insurance policies within the same household be of the same type. Without this
provision an insurer might find it administratively burdensome to have different options
made by individual family members.
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either the Tort Waiver Option or the Tort Maintenance Option for
himself or herself. That person's choice determines that person's
rights no matter which vehicle he or she is occupying or which vehicle
he or she might be struck by. The rights of all resident relatives who
are not motor vehicle owners are governed by the choice applicable to
the motor vehicle that they were occupying at the time of the injury, if
that vehicle was owned by a member of the household.
d. In the event of a personal injury occurring prior to the effec-
tive date of a required choice, if there are conflicting choices within
the household creating questions as to the applicability of the Tort
Waiver Option or the Tort Maintenance Option, or if there is a failure
to make a choice as required by this Act, the Tort Maintenance Op-
tion is applicable.
SECTION 7. TORT RIGHTS AND LEGAL LLrr UNDER THIS ACT.1 1
a. No Tort Waiver Insured has a cause of action for injury above
the tort threshold against, nor is liable to, any other person on ac-
count of an accident occurring within this State, except as provided in
subsections b, c, d, and except that such an insured has a cause of
action, regardless of the tort threshold, for injury caused other than
by the ownership, operation, or use of a motor vehicle, and against an
uninsured motorist.
b. A Tort Waiver Insured has a cause of action for personal in-
jury above the tort threshold for uncompensated economic loss
against, and is liable for same to, any person insured under Tort
Waiver or Tort Maintenance Coverage.
c. A person covered by Tort Maintenance Coverages has an un-
limited cause of action for injury against another person so covered.
d. An uninsured motorist has no cause of action against a Tort
Waiver Insured for (1) injury above the tort threshold other than for
uncompensated economic loss and (2) damage to property except
damage in excess of the property damage liability limits mandated
under this State's financial responsibility law.
[e. Notwithstanding the foregoing, when a claim is made for
uncompensated economic loss, if the party claimed against fails to
provide the claimant, within ninety days after either the accident or
the claim, with a written obligation to pay the uncompensated eco-
nomic loss, plus a reasonable attorney's fee as provided under subsec-
tion 2(a) (6), the claimant can pursue a claim for both noneconomic
and uncompensated economic loss. Even if a party claimed against
undertakes such a timely obligation, when, beyond a reasonable
11. This section defines the extent to which someone who is injured in a motor vehicle
accident is prohibited from bringing a claim above the tort threshold. A railroad, for ex-
ample, covering the motor vehicles it owns under Personal Injury Protection remains liable
for accidents in which its train negligently collides with a motor vehicle.
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doubt, the party claimed against was guilty of wanton or intentional
misconduct in causing the accident, the claimant has an unlimited
cause of action for injury against such a party.12 ]
SECTION 8. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS TO TORT MAINTENANCE COV-
ERAGE. Where appropriate, laws and regulations of this State applica-
ble to uninsured motorist coverage are applicable to Tort
Maintenance Coverage.
12. Under this alternative proposal, when a claim is made for uncompensated eco-
nomic loss, the claimant is foreclosed from pursuing the tort claim any further only if the
defendant provides the victim, within 90 days, a written commitment to pay the claimant's
economic loss in excess of any other available coverage, plus a reasonable attorney's fee
(perhaps capped at 10% of the amount due, due to less work required by the early offer).
The claimant, however, could still pursue the claim if it could be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant was guilty of intentional or wanton misconduct in causing
the accident. (As another alternative, the provision could allow only actions for economic
loss and punitive damages to survive such an early offer.)
For the origins of this approach, whereby full-scale tort liability can be avoided only by
such early offers, see Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal
Injury Claims by Defendant's Prompt Tender of Claimant's Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REv.
589 (1982). Under this approach, defendants are encouraged, but not required, to expe-
ditiously offer to pay benefits covering only net economic loss above collateral sources,
rather than spending precious resources litigating fault and the value of noneconomic loss,
as well as paying for the latter. Id.
This "early offers" service might well be seen as preferable, for example, than simply
allowing an injury victim to claim in tort for only uncompensated economic loss. Under
the latter device, a defending insurer is arguably under a strong incentive to resist and
delay payment of a tort claim for uncompensated economic loss, knowing its exposure is
thus limited. This is a common complaint for property damage tort claims against some
insurers when they similarly face no spur of possible payment of noneconomic loss. Under
the "early offers" approach, an insurer must earn the right to pay only economic loss, by
promptly (within 90 days) offering to do so. On the other hand, a defendant with either
no, or very doubtful, liability would not be pressured to make an early offer to evade full-
scale tort liability.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX C
1. This Appendix was developed by Jeffrey O'Connell and PaulJamie-
son. It was compiled with the permission of and is based on data
and descriptions in STATE FARM INS. COS., NO-FAULT REFERENCE
MANUAL E-101 to E-106 (Robert Sasser ed., 1995) [hereinafter
STATE FARM MANUAL], AMERICAN INS. ASS'N, SUMMARY OF SELECTED
STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE 16, 20-34 (1988) [hereinafter AIA-1988], and AMERICAN INS.
Ass'N, SUMMARY OF SELECTED STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELAT-
ING TO AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 22-32 (1995) [hereinafter AIA-
1995]. Specifically, information in columns 5-8 is taken from
STATE FARM MANUAL, supra, while the figures in column 4 are taken
from AIA-1988 and AIA-1995, supra. This Appendix is based on
current law, while the data in Tables 1-3, supra main text, are based
on laws in effect January 1, 1988. For information on how and
when RAND calculated its data, see supra main text at notes 58-63
and accompanying text. For substantive changes to no-fault laws
since 1988 in Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, see notes accompanying tbl. 1,
supra. These changes, as well as less significant changes between
1988 and 1995, have been noted in notes a-t to this Appendix. For
more detailed descriptions of all changes, including some not
noted here, see STATE FARM MANUAL, supra. See also ROBERT H.
JoosT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW (Supp. 1994 &
forthcoming 1995).
2. "T" designates states with tort laws currently in effect; "NF"
designates no-fault states; "AO" designates add-on states. For defi-
nitions of these terms, see supra main text at note 4.
3. "C" and "FR" designate whether the state has compulsory or finan-
cial responsibility minimum requirements. Compulsory insurance
means " [i] nsurance required by law. Under compulsory tort liabil-
ity insurance legislation, for instance, such insurance is a prerequi-
site to registration of the automobile, which in turn is a
prerequisite to its legal operation," ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 573
(1965). Financial responsibility laws mean
[l]egislation requiring a driver convicted of a serious driv-
ing violation or involved in an accident causing specified
results (for example, personal injury or property damage
above a statutory minimum) to post "security" (usually in
the form of a certificate of insurance) in a designated
amount against any liability arising from a past accident
1996]
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invoking the law, and "proof" (also usually in the form of a
certificate of insurance) of financial ability to meet obliga-
tions arising from future accidents. More inclusive defini-
tions sometimes cover on the one hand compulsory
insurance legislation and on the other hand legislation re-
quiring less demonstration of financial responsibility than
that incident to furnishing both "proof" (as to future acci-
dents) and "security" (as to a past accident).
Id. at 577; see also, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DICTIONARY OF
INSURANCE TERMS 26 (1949).
4. The first number denotes the minimum dollar amount of per per-
son Bodily Injury (BI) liability insurance required; the second
number denotes the minimum dollar amount of per accident BI
liability insurance required (but see supra note d); the third number
denotes the minimum dollar amount of Property Damage (PD) lia-
bility insurance required (all numbers denote dollars in
thousands). These limits reflect the status of the laws as of Novem-
ber 11, 1994.
222 [VOL. 55:160
